Governance through Conflict: Consensus Building in the *Fenicia* Urban Renewal Project in Bogotá, Colombia

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The Fenicia project is an urban redevelopment project in an area of downtown Bogotá, within the immediate vicinity of Los Andes University, the principal promoter of the project. The project has not yet been completed but the way in which it has been formulated, as well as its characteristics and basic objectives, have made it a reference point in the city of Bogotá. From the very beginning, the project has confronted numerous conflicts and tensions between the different stakeholders involved in its implementation. The conflict management approach implemented in this case study has contributed to correcting many of the equity concerns that other urban renewal projects in the city have generated. It does so by promoting inclusive and deliberative dynamics between the promoter, local authorities, and property owners in the zone. Land readjustment is an instrument that could allow the current property owners to remain in the area, participate as partners in the benefits of the project, and play a leading role in decision-making processes.

The *Fenicia* urban renewal project has been examined from diverse perspectives (Pinilla, 2018; Hong and Tierney, 2018; Castro, 2016; Perdomo, 2015; Pérez 2014). The project has been deemed an exemplary participative and community-based urban renewal project (APA, 2020).[1] Further, the *Fenicia* project is one of the few examples in the Western Hemisphere where the land management tool known as land readjustment (LR) has been used in the context of the transformation of built environments. This is an approach that has been very successful in Europe and Asia (Larson, 1997; Sorensen, 2000; Karki, 2004; Hong and Needham, 2007). However, most of the conditions generally included in the approach to allow the participation of original residents so as to reduce gentrification were not incorporated in the original version of the project, their subsequent inclusion resulting, rather, from conflict between resident communities, public officials and the private promoter of the project (the Los Andes University). Moreover, it is argued in this paper that the current version and outcomes of the *Fenicia* project can only be explained in the context of the earlier process of urban renewal of the *Las Aguas* neighbourhood, which includes the *Manzana 5* (City Block 5) project, and the underlying social and political contention that resulted from it.

This analysis of the *Fenicia* project is framed according to the notion that planning

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and policymaking can be classified according to the characteristics of the model within which the public action in question is embedded. Scholars recognize two models: a traditional top-down decision-making process that is heavily reliant on the notion of planners as expert decision-makers (the 'rational model'); and the 'collaborative model', which recognizes that policymaking and implementation are contingent on the consent, commitment and actions carried out by a diversity of participating stakeholders (Innes, 1996; Forester, 1999; Frank and Elliott, 2002; Shmueli *et al*., 2008).

Furthermore, it is possible to associate a specific rationale for conflict management with each of these models. While the rational model tends to view conflict as an issue that must be swiftly overcome so that the originally planned results may be achieved, the collaborative model tends to face conflict deliberatively via 'consensus building' that itself is part of the planning process (Innes and Booher, 1999). In the course of this paper we argue that the *Fenicia* project shifted its planning model (from a rational to a collaborative model) in response to conflict, which itself allowed for the introduction of discussion platforms, so the project could be shaped by the contrasting views and needs of various groups of stakeholders.

It is especially the case of urban renewal processes that the interests of different stakeholders naturally entail conflicts that are closely related to land management and the distribution of the profit generated by achieving the highest and best use of the land (Blokhuis *et al*., 2012). Consequently, it is understood that the planning model involves a relationship that embeds both an urban renewal project and models of land management. Traditional means, such as direct purchase and expropriation, are related to the rational model, while land readjustment is related to the collaborative model (Hong and Needham, 2007). In this regard, the market-driven rationale of the real estate industry in Latin American countries has

resulted in dominant ideas of urban renewal that set barriers for the implementation of participative projects and the use of land readjustment as an inclusive land management mechanism. However, the *Fenicia* project showcases the fact that conflict management through consensus-building permitted the introduction of a land readjustment mechanism, even though resident communities, public officials and private developers had no previous experience of the approach in urban renewal projects.

Accordingly, throughout this research we examine, from the perspective of diverse stakeholders, the ways in which the transposition of different interests and priorities resulted in improvements to the *Fenicia* project and the achievement of agreements amongst the parties involved, itself an outcome of the unresolved conflicts and underlying mistrust that resulted from the *Manzana* 5 project. This examination is intended to characterize the different typologies of conflict that arose at different stages of the urban renewal of the *Las Aguas* neighbourhood, as well as the means employed by the various stakeholders during the negotiation process. As a result of this analysis we underline the characteristics of the case study that allowed a comprehensive re-engineering of practices, institutions, and rationales of urban renewal in favour of a more legitimate and transparent urban redevelopment project.

This paper is divided into four sections. We begin by presenting the historical context of urban renewal policy in Bogotá, and in particular in the city's downtown area, from the beginning of the twentieth century. This account is included as part of the research because it is important to portray how the concept of urban renewal in Bogotá is, and has been, influenced by everchanging political, social and economic contexts and rationales. Next, we discuss the *Manzana* 5 project as a preliminary experience of urban renewal in the *Las Aguas* neighbourhood, which shaped the social and political panorama of the area. We then detail the

milestones of each phase of the *Fenicia* project over the last ten years by analysing diverse data sources including participant observation, semi-structured interviews with involved stakeholders,[2] audiovisual materials, official documents and fieldwork.[3] Finally, we present the main conclusions of the research in terms of the phenomenology of change and the effects of a consensus building approach that deliberately placed conflict at the centre of the planning and implementation phases of the project.

The Development of Urban Renewal Policy in Bogotá: Evolution of Practices and Rationale

The historical development of the public policy surrounding the transformation of Bogotá's downtown is, to some extent, the reflection of patterns of global models and conceptualizations of urbanism. However, many elements of the local socio-political background have also influenced the implementation of urban projects. As such, this policy development can be divided into four main stages, each of which has brought with it particular characteristics that continue to reflect the ways in which the stakeholders involved conceive of urban renewal.

Several authors agree that the first stage of urban renewal policy in Bogotá may be traced to the first half of the twentieth century when the principles of modernist urbanism clearly influenced various public interventions (Dominguez, 2007; Colón, 2005; Mondragón, 2008; Carreira, 2007; Martínez, 2012; Pérez, 2015). A common characteristic, highlighted by the critical examination of the interventions that took place during this time, is that the rationale behind the projects was not only of a physical-spatial nature but also sought to cleanse the area of inhabitants and lifestyles that were deemed uncivilized.

For instance, Colón (2005) argues that the 'sanitization' of the Paseo Bolívar in the 1920s constituted an intervention in an area that was described as 'a dirty, unsanitary suburb, inhabited by criminals', adding that it was proposed to relocate the original inhabitants to different zones of the city because, 'populous working-class settlements may constitute centres of disorder, and foment the formation of a hostile caste'. Dominguez (2007) points out that the public works plan, in 1938, for celebration of the quadricentennial of the city's foundation were intended to fix the 'flaws' in citizenship, rather than to construct a modern city. Similarly, Carreira (2007) concludes that the 'spirit' of the plans for hosting the Ninth International Conference of the Americas in 1948 centred on hiding the social conflict and misery of Bogotá's downtown area. Furthermore, Mondragón (2005) and Pérez (2015) cite the well-known architecture magazine *Proa* in order to characterize the rationale behind urban renewal policy during the late 1940s, showing how it repeatedly called for the demolition of entire blocks and frequently employed violent, colonialist language.

The second stage of urban renewal policy was marked by two aspects that came together between the 1960s and 1980s. On the one hand, as can be seen in official publications (Bogotá, 1964, cited by Arteaga and Escallón, 2012 and Pérez, 2015) and in academic research (CID UNAL, 1969), the political discourse that supported intervention in Bogotá's downtown called for the densification of built-up areas to provide housing for the increasing flows of rural migrants to the city and to prevent a disorderly process of urban sprawl. On the other hand, the involvement of private developers in the execution of the policy was formalized. This does not mean that financial gain was not present as a motivating factor during the first stage,[4] but rather – as Salazar and Cortez describe – involved the enactment of several national and local regulations that enabled developers to extend their reach and achieve '*the first liberalization of the built city*' (Salazar and Cortez, 1992, p. 41). Emblematic examples of state-driven urban renewal projects executed

by private developers during this period were the International Business Centre of 1963 and the 'San Façon' project of 1972 (Martínez, 2012).

The third stage of urban renewal is framed by the period of severe social and urban crisis that affected Bogotá during the 1980s and 1990s. Issues related to security (Becket and Godoy, 2010) transport, pollution, and administrative inaction (Alonso, 1999; Ceballos and Martin, 2004) had led in the previous decades to an accelerated exodus of high and middle income populations from the downtown area and the subsequent reception of marginalized inhabitants living in tenements and squatting abandoned buildings (Manrique, 2013). In parallel, crucial political and legal breakthroughs were taking place in the field of urban renewal with the enactment of the Urban Reform Act (Law 9 of 1989), plus the promulgation of Colombia's new Political Constitution in 1991. These legal reforms incorporated new principles and tools for the execution of urban renewal policies, such as the primacy of the general interest over private interest, the public function of urbanism and urban renewal as a reason for exercising eminent domain.

In this context, the administrations of mayors Mockus in 1995–1997 and 2000–2003 and Peñalosa in 1998–2000 saw the development of a distinct public agenda intended to renovate Bogotá's downtown area. This agenda focused in particular on the enhancement of security by promoting civility and reclaiming public spaces, so that the area could once again attract private capital for investment in the area. As Beckett and Godoy (2010) point out, this agenda was clearly inspired by the theory of 'broken windows policing'[5] that had been implemented in New York City around the same period. The most visible of the projects devised during this period was the demolition of the *Cartucho*[6] neighbourhood and its replacement by a large metropolitan park. While the implementation of the agenda in general has received much international praise (Forero, 2001; Silva, 2002;

Caballero, 2004), other scholars criticize the rationale behind the model of urban renewal, arguing that, much like the first stage, it was heavily reliant on a set vision of what a 'civilized' urban lifestyle should be, and that it constituted a particularly ineffective and, indeed, harmful approach to the issue of homelessness and drug trafficking in Bogotá's downtown (Góngora and Suárez, 2008; Pérez, 2015; Suárez, 2017).

The fourth stage of urban renewal policy in Bogotá consisted of the implementation of a normative and institutional framework for the adequate and systematic coordination of public and private agents in the implementation of urban renewal projects (Escallón, 2014). The normative framework refers to the enactment of Law 388 of 1997 and of Bogotá's *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* (Land-Use Plan) in 2000, which zoned specific areas of the city that were potentially subject to renewal and defined a specific planning instrument for the purpose: the *plan parcial* (partial plan). As for the institutional framework, this refers to the creation in 1998 of the *Empresa de Renovación Urbana* (Urban Renewal Corporation – ERU), a public entity dedicated to the promotion and enablement of urban renewal in the city, mainly through the acquisition of land required for the purpose. This framework set the basis for assigning roles in the implementation of urban renewal policy: private developers formulated urban renewal plans for the assigned areas while the municipality verified the compliance of such plans and enabled their implementation through the application of land management mechanisms.

This form of urban renewal continues as the reigning paradigm in Bogotá and Colombia today. However, as both the specialized literature (Acero, 2010; Mayorga, 2012; Escallón, 2014; Contreras, 2019) and official data (SDP, 2013) have shown, the model has, with very few – controversial – exceptions, failed to implement any projects. Various explanations have been given for the crisis of the model: for example, lack of trust and understand-

ing between developers and public officials (Acero, 2010); the inefficiency and inexperience of developers in dealing with the bureaucratic procedures of the partial plans (Mayorga 2012); the availability of redevelopment areas in the city not governed by other zoning norms (Contreras, 2019); and social unrest around the lack of legitimacy of the model due to the intrinsically speculative nature of the proposals advanced by developers (Escallón, 2014).

This model was, to some extent, characteristic of the process of urban renewal followed in the Las Aguas neighbourhood in the so-called *Manzana 5* project, as well as in the first version of the *Fenicia* project. As the following sections describe, while the implementation of the *Manzana 5* project was one of the main reasons for growing social unrest and the crisis of the new model, the *Fenicia* project explicitly changed the conceptual basis governing its implementation.

The Urban Renewal Process in the Las Aguas Neighbourhood

The urban renewal process in the Las Aguas neighbourhood in recent years involves two principal projects: the *Manzana 5* project, which began in 2006, and the *Fenicia* project, which was originally formulated in 2009. In this section we provide a description of the main characteristics of both projects.

The *Manzana 5* Project

There is extensive political and historical background underlying the discourse of the leaders of the residents' associations involved in one way or another in the *Fenicia* project. However, the predominant rhetorical instrument employed by them involves remembrance of the *Manzana 5* project as evidence of the threats posed to neighbourhood residents by such schemes, while also providing a symbol of inequitable, state-driven urban renewal in downtown Bogotá in general.

It is not uncommon, even today, for the leaders of grassroots organizations to say things such as, 'first, they took *Manzana 5* and now they are coming for the rest of the neighbourhood', or for the topic to arise during interviews with public officials or members of the project's promotion team, regarding the *Fenicia* project.

As such, it is important to understand the *Manzana 5* project both as a comparative case for the study of conflict typologies and their effects, and as the most important precedent that to some degree accounts for the creation of the residents' associations which emerged around the *Fenicia* project. On the one hand, the mere physical proximity[7] of the projects raises questions regarding why they engendered such different types of conflict and that their results were so dissimilar. On the other, the study of the *Manzana 5* project helps to explain not only the political legitimacy and strength of residents' associations in Fenicia, but also a change in the approach of the university to the project and of the role played by public institutions and officials.

The *Manzana 5* project was an official urban renewal project designed and launched by the ERU in 2006 as part of a major renovation plan for Bogotá's downtown. It was originally funded by the Spanish Cooperation Agency and included the designation of a part of the plot for the construction of a Spanish cultural centre and for commercial use, high-end student residences and hotel services. Some 8,500 m² of land had been identified for the project where plots were occupied by about thirty properties that were to be acquired by the ERU under eminent domain. However, due to the European economic crisis of 2008, by which time most original residents had been evicted and most of the land already purchased by the ERU, the Spanish Cooperation Agency withdrew funding for the project, resulting in a change in the original plan. Instead of the Spanish cultural centre, the area it would have occupied was designated for the construction

of a public cinematheque. Despite this inconvenience, fiduciary rights to participate in the project were auctioned in 2011 and the project – developed by private investors – was inaugurated in 2017 under the name of 'City U'; the cinematheque opened in late 2019.

Throughout the process different types of conflict can be identified but very few expressions of civil activism. In general terms, it is possible to determine that, despite the fact that the term *Manzana 5* is nowadays commonly employed to symbolize coercive official displacement or eviction carried out for the purposes of speculation, little or no civil resistance emerged at the time of the land acquisition. As some ethnographic studies conducted in the area, such as Pérez (2014) and Urbina (2015), explain, during the process of expropriation and eviction, only a handful of the original residents resisted the process, and the ones who did, did so individually, mainly by employing judicial and bureaucratic means. On this, in his analysis of the typology of conflict of one of the resisting residents, Pérez (2014) notes that:

Jairo and his family's efforts to respond to the ERU through official channels are an example of the ways in which people targeted by state policies appropriate the language and artefacts of bureaucracy… Independently of their success at getting the attention of government agencies, in Manzana 5 such practices were revealing of residents' attempts to return conceptions of state legitimacy and justice to the project. (Perez, 2014, p. 93)

The lack of any form of civic organization during the expropriation process is explained differently by different stakeholders. While one of the interviewees in Pérez (2014) states that the financial distress suffered by most of the residents led them to sell their properties to the ERU promptly, other original residents suggested to us in interviews that there was a widespread lack of understanding of the situation until it was too late.

However, a common denominator in various portrayals of the *Manzana* 5 process is state-driven employment of techniques intended to prevent the proliferation of civic and social organizations. Several complaints have been made over the years about such practices, ranging from the posting of misleading official notices announcing ERU's ownership of the plots before the official purchase (figure 1), to the systematic harassment of reluctant residents and untimely nocturnal evictions.

The immediate effect of the implementation of the *Manzana 5* project was a widespread rejection of state-driven land management and of urban renewal in general. As Urbina (2015) has documented, in the years following this case there was a proliferation of new grassroots organizations established to denounce the lack of protection for those living in urban renewal projects. A clear example of the incidence of *Manzana* 5 in the public critique of this model of urban renewal is that the newly elected Gustavo Petro (2012–2015) addressed the matter in his inaugural speech as mayor:

We do not want to see more processes of urban renewal like the one that exists two blocks from here or like the one that occurred one block down the street or in San Victorino, three blocks away, in which the poor were expelled from the city at rip-off prices by the state in order to implement large real estate projects that exclude traditional populations. Jairo Anibal Niño died because one of these processes, which theorists call gentrification, but which put simply entail paying an impoverished resident 350,000 pesos per square metre and then selling this on at 27 million pesos the square metre when it is destined for a shopping centre or at five to six million pesos when housing is to be built.

However, it is important to note that, interviewed today, public officials who were in charge of the *Manzana 5* project at the time also underline other effects of the project:

Today there are positive results in terms of aesthetics or habitability at the level of the sidewalk, which are much more noticeable than in other projects; [the project] ushered in security for people visiting the downtown area. And now, with the inauguration of the Cinematheque it is going to be a site were many cultural events will occur, a place where you can sit and take time out from the stresses of the city.

Figure 1. ERU notices on *Manzana 5* buildings. (*Photo*: Federico Pérez, 2014)

This remark shows that even today government officials continue to defend the rationale of the project, with an approach that focuses only on the physical-spatial aspects of urban renewal, with no concern for the socio-political tensions that underlie the *Manzana* 5 project. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the project clearly resembles the picture painted by the specialized literature (Innes and Booher, 1996; Forester, 1999; Frank and Elliot, 2002; Shmueli *et al*., 2008) regarding the way conflict emerges according to the models of public policy that embed public action. The *Manzana* 5 project illustrates how the implementation of an urban renewal project developed according to a rational model of public policy will disregard the benefits of a consensus-building strategy in favour of guaranteeing the achievement of the tangible results that were pre-established for the project by experts and planners.

Further, we emphasize the fact that the land management mechanism employed in the *Manzana 5* project is closely related to the rational model of policymaking in which it was embedded. This is because the widespread acquisition of land by direct purchase or expropriation allows for the execution of an urban renewal project without the need to engage in participative processes of conflict resolution, whereas a land readjustment scheme can only take place if owners and inhabitants form an active part of the decision-making process as in collaborative planning models.

The *Fenicia* Project

The *Fenicia* project is located in the Las Aguas Neighbourhood of downtown Bogotá, close to the *Manzana 5* project (figures 2 and 3). The area of intervention comprises nine blocks and 504 plots of land that together make up an area of approximately 8 hectares. The original land-use of the area was residential

Figure 2. *Fenicia* project localization. (*Source*: Authors)

Figure 3. *Fenicia*: panoramic view of the project. (*Source*: Authors)

(50 per cent of the area of the plan) with three housing typologies: (1) one- and two-storey adobe houses; (2) two- and thee-storey self-built houses of concrete and brick; and (3) condominium buildings. The second most common form of land-use was for commerce and services, principally restaurants, retail and parking lots. Parking lots had the greatest impact on the zone, occupying around 21 per cent of the total area (Universidad de los Andes, 2014).

By the end of 2010, the initiative of the Universidad de los Andes to gain approval for the *Fenicia* project had stalled. Although a proposal had been prepared and submitted to the Municipal Planning Secretariat in 2009, it still had to undergo the formal administrative processes to which all such plans must be subjected: the acceptance feasibility by the secretariat and the public notification stage. This was a common situation for many urban renewal partial plans submitted by private investors. The common perception among private developers was

that barriers were somehow erected against this type of project. Their proposals were neither declared feasible, nor categorically rejected by the Planning Secretariat.

Below we examine the four stages of the design and implementation of the *Fenicia* project identified during the research.

Preliminary Stage:
Shifting the 'Business as Usual' Approach

The proposal for the project, which the Universidad de los Andes first initiated in 2007, responded to a purely real estate logic, driven almost exclusively by the expectations of the university. During those first years of examination and formulation of the proposal, no information had been provided to the neighbouring community, and consultation had been completely lacking. Beyond its administrative and campus-management units, the university community had not been involved in the process.

This context led to the emergence of a new

approach to promoting and leading urban renewal projects within the university, promoted by a group of professors interested in issues of sustainable development, social inclusion and urban planning. The proposal to change the approach and methodology of the plan was accepted by the university authorities at the end of 2010. By then it was clear to them that, overall, the approval of urban renewal plans was not progressing satisfactorily in the city and, in particular, that civil unrest over these initiatives had grown in Bogotá's downtown area.

As Franco and Pinilla (2018) point out, the new project, which began in 2010 and was called *Progresa Fenicia*, gathered experiences from other countries in its design and acquired an integrative and participative structure involving different interest groups (including owners, tenants, business owners, government entities with a presence in the area); it went beyond the parameters of current regulations. The initial, 2007 proposal underwent multiple changes in 2010, promoting a participative process from the design stages and involving a management model under a collaborative governance scheme.

This shift from a traditional, rational, planning model towards a collaborative one can be explained by two principal factors. Firstly, as mentioned above, there was a growing level of rejection from local communities of urban renewal projects, as well as widespread mistrust of the real estate developers and public institutions in charge of the promotion of such projects. Undoubtedly, the unresolved social and political conflict inherited from the *Manzana* 5 project was one of the main catalysts for civic unrest, as it was an iconic case that highlighted the risks for local communities of a top-down urban renewal project.

Secondly, the fact that the design and promotion of the *Fenicia* project was the work of a university rather than a real estate developer might also help explain the shift in the planning model used. Not only did the university have a different kind of interest

in urban development that was not exclusively focused on maximizing capital gains but, also, the project was regarded by the institution's authorities as an opportunity to experiment with previously unexplored planning models and land management mechanisms.

First Stage: Trust Building and Data Collection

Under the new approach, the university formed a multidisciplinary work team made up of professors, administrative staff from the university campus office and some external experts. This team oversaw the re-engineering of the project, its approach towards and interaction with the surrounding community and the process of consultation and agreement with public authorities.

We describe this change in the methodology as a transition in the planning model used in urban operations: from a rational model to a collaborative one. This may be exemplified by three specific elements in the implementation of the project: (1) there was an active interest on the part of the university and of public bodies to increase their understanding of the socioeconomic composition of the community and the needs and interests of its residents; (2) there was an explicit hope that the project would generate mutual benefits for all parties; and (3) continuous efforts were made to ensure widespread distribution of information amongst stakeholders.

The first phase of this endeavour consisted of work on two main fronts. First was characterization of the neighbourhood and its inhabitants: for this activity, secondary data were collected regarding the composition of the neighbourhood and its inhabitants. In parallel, exploratory activities were carried out with recognized civic leaders from the zone who were identified through consultation with local organizations such as the parish of *Las Aguas* and the *Junta de Acción Comunal*[8] (local community board), which allowed the secondary information collected to be compared and validated.

Second, and in parallel, a preliminary identification of interest groups was carried out and the first round of meetings held with their representatives: small traders, large landowners, social leaders, institutional actors. These meetings served to fine tune the design of a survey of living conditions and to develop a series of workshops involving different actors. The survey was intended to establish the socioeconomic conditions of a representative group of the population.

At this point, the process faced one of the first manifestations of tension between the stakeholders. Although the initial objective of the project was to survey all the residents and tradespeople in the project area as well as in two other neighbourhoods close by, the final results were incomplete (Pinilla, 2018). Many inhabitants refused to open the doors of their homes and businesses, arguing that the promoter of the project had no right to perform state-like activities and no authority to enter their homes to carry out a census. Some local leaders and condominium representatives expressed their rejection of this activity formally, informing the university of their refusal to comply.

As a result, the project had to adapt to having only partial primary information on the socioeconomic conditions of the sector's inhabitants. The information collected did not exceed 60 per cent of the area initially defined for the survey. As a result, the project had to complement its socioeconomic characterization with focus groups and ethnographic work carried out by students and professors of the Anthropology Department (*ibid.*).

This scenario also shows how conflict shaped the *Fenicia* project and its planning model. The failure of the census was not only a manifestation of citizen unrest and mistrust of the university, but also resulted in increased efforts by the planners to understand the characteristics of the resident population in greater depth, which would have been impossible had they depended solely on the census data.

At the same time, however, the local government set out to reshape completely the project's formulation. Eventually it was agreed that an entirely new process would be initiated. The university authorities were concerned that this implied that all earlier work by the initiative between 2007 and 2009 would be lost. Although it would have been possible to come to an agreement with the Planning Secretariat to transfer all the background and technical papers produced during the original process, the decision was made to start again from scratch, as a sign of commitment and transparency to the formulation of a fresh project.

This first phase was characterized by high levels of distrust and antipathy on the part of many stakeholders from the resident community, who repeatedly expressed their lack of faith in the university, on the grounds that the original proposal had, in the immediate past, been carried out with no consultation or negotiation. Not only was the transparency of the university questioned, but so too was the role it was proposing to play in the new approach. The position of some neighbourhood residents was simply to question the legitimacy of the university to formulate and carry out any urban redevelopment project. In response to this mistrust between the community and the university, participative urban design workshops were organized by the Faculty of Architecture in which various stakeholders from the community were invited to propose a collective vision for the urban transformation of the area (figure 4).

In parallel, different workshops were held during which, as Franco and Pinilla (2018) affirm, it was possible to verify:

the differences and disparities in the expectations and needs of the community, which responded to variables such as socioeconomic condition, form of land tenure (owner, lessee) or economic activity pursued on the real estate (business, parking, housing). As a consequence of these differences, the work of rapprochement and discussion continued, inviting the different segments of actors to participate in various trust building activities. (Franco and Pinilla, 2018, p. 531)

Figure 4. Participative Urban Design Workshops, 2013. (*Photo*: Universidad de los Andes, 2014)

Although the division of the population into relatively homogeneous interest groups was always important to the project and enabled the differentiation of responses according to groups' interests, it generated tensions and was the subject to complaints from leaders who deemed it a strategy intended to divide the community. In fact, this mechanism, which was intended to be more participative and inclusive than the tools used in the earlier process, ended up being a source of conflict between stakeholders that could be explained by pre-existing tensions between residents of different socioeconomic backgrounds. It is important to underline how some of the efforts and activities that were intended to resolve conflicts and increase trust among the community and other stakeholders, actually uncovered tensions between residents that probably would have not been addressed otherwise.

During this phase of the process the community did not act in an organized or centralized way and had no single spokesperson or representative structure. Although different leaders were emerging within the different interest groups, at the time the community did not have an organizational structure that allowed it to unite and represent a broadset of stakeholders and interests. The process of trust building by the university was not aimed at promoting or propitiating the organization of the community but, rather, to seek direct interaction with as many actors as possible. As such, its strategy as promoter of the project could be characterized as one that privileged negotiation with individual stakeholders, rather than with a collective or block of people.

In parallel with the community work, the university sought to advance its proposal for the partial plan, which was developed through different scenarios of participation, consultation and negotiation, and officially presented to the city government for study and approval in late 2012.

As the consultation process on the project progressed prior to its review by city officials, and since it was necessary to progress the trust building phase and to respond to an approach from some landowners for inclusion in the project, it was decided to design a simple, easily understood document, the 'Declaration of Intent and Goodwill'. As Franco and Pinilla (2018) point out, 'the declaration of intent did not represent a definitive contract or commitment, but a sign of goodwill between the parties', and further argue that:

Although the document did not contemplate binding obligations for the parties and did not represent a definitive acceptance of the project, it served to show the city administration and other landowners that the project had consolidated an important basis of legitimacy, and that, even prior to its definitive adoption by the city administration, agreements had been consolidated that could potentially make a decisive contribution to the success of the implementation phase. (Franco and Pinilla, 2018, p. 531)

This declaration of intent was developed because of the tensions that emerged during the participative urban design workshops and was intended to increase trust amongst the parties. The mechanism was, however, aimed entirely at landowners and to some extent relegated the importance of lessees.

For the university team, the accomplishments of these first stages represented a great success. There was no precedent in the city for an urban project that had made a similar effort to ensure participation and inclusion. As the 'declaration of feasibility' issued by the District Planning Secretariat at the end of October 2013 stated, the following types of activities were carried out during the project formulation process between 2010 and 2013: ethnographic work; plenary sessions and community meetings; social geography activities; interviews and focus groups; exhibitions; participative urban design workshops; meetings with co-owner assemblies; and eleven briefings organized at the end of the process that provided detailed information on the process carried out and the principal characteristics of the project (SDP, 2018).

Requests submitted by residents of the pro-

ject area were also examined by the Planning Secretariat, which responded in exhaustive detail to every observation or concern. According to the Planning Secretariat (*ibid*.), a total of 3,087 people attended the different interaction, consultation, discussion and exchange activities organized between the promoter and the residents of the area, in addition to those who attended the public exhibition organized to present the plans in July and August 2013.

Despite the general belief of the promoter's team that the process had been inclusive, transparent and consensual, an important sector of the community harboured a different viewpoint and questioned both the process and its results. Some of the leaders repeatedly expressed their concern to the Planning Secretariat about the imminent possibility that the project would be formally declared feasible. Such concerns were taken into account by the public officials responsible for drafting the declaration of feasibility. In Resolution 1254 of 25 October 2013, which determined the feasibility of the partial plan proposal, the Planning Secretariat included an exception, which specified the possibility of making further adjustments or incorporating clarifications that might emerge from any final agreements reached between the promoter, residents, owners, and the city government. In this sense, it was determined that 'social and management agreements' should be developed, specified and/or clarified in the final act of adoption of the project.

In our view, this alternative procedure reflects a clear intention on the part of the city government to ensure a more balanced approval process. Although it was important to recognize that the project met the legal conditions, standards and procedures for the formulation of partial plans, it was no less true that it might be strategic to promote a final and definitive round of agreements on the proposal to ensure greater levels of consensus and legitimacy. This final round was not a legal requirement but, as indicated, was an attempt to ensure legitimacy of the project.

Second Stage: Negotiation amongst Equals

However, the Planning Secretariat's publication of a formal administrative document declaring the plan to be feasible generated a great deal of discontent amongst residents and landowners. As one city official recalled when interviewed, 'Once the [declaration of] feasibility was published, we practically had to start over on the participation process, to regain people's trust'. That discontent may be explained as a reaction to sudden and clear evidence that the process was moving forward to its final stage, prior to its formal administrative approval.

Up to this point, political organization amongst the inhabitants of the zone had been incipient, but these circumstances led to the strengthening of two principal civic organizations: the 'Don't Take Over *Las Aguas* Committee' and the 'Community of the Houses'.

The first organization was formed by owners of the residential units in a condominium called *Multifamiliares Calle 20* and a non-profit organization called *Asociación Mutualista Sagrada Familia*, both principally made up of middle-income households. The other was an organization of residents of lower income households, including lessees and possessors, among others. There is some evidence of a certain degree of conflict between these two representative organizations, evidenced by competing candidacies in the elections to the local *Junta de Acción Comunal* (Pérez, 2014) and differences in their agendas (Perdomo, 2015).

These grassroots organizations manifested themselves in different ways and they engaged in several forms of informal civic protest, such as regular discussion panels and forums, social media activism, and protests and rallies. The significance of the demonstrations organized by residents' organizations is apparent to this

Figure 5. Pamphlet inviting people to take part in the demonstration. (*Source*: Facebook page of 'Don't take over Las Aguas')

day, and it is common for those who were involved to refer to the series of protests that took place between 29 October (just four days after the declaration of feasibility was published) and 11 November 2013.

As figure 5 shows, the first rally was advertised in a pamphlet that expressed the overall message of the group:

… Arguing that they will create public spaces and densify the downtown area, the District [Bogotá] and the University, they will in fact ride roughshod over embedded rights, such as: the right to private property, to work and to dignified housing, among others.

These impositions will not benefit the community at all but make millions for construction monopolies and investors with links to the higher education institution. The zone will suffer excessive increases in the cost of public services.

This series of civic protests reached its zenith in what is known as the *Marcha de las Antorchas* (the March of the Torches), an event that was addressed by a community leader who recalled how 'We must not forget how the university trembled when we organ-

ized the March of the Torches'. As figure 6 shows, these events employed the symbolism and practices of historical civic movements, in particular one of the most remarkable protests in the history of Bogotá and of Colombia: The Silent March of 1947.[9]

However, the civic organizations represented the community on a formally instituted negotiating table that was promoted both by the university and the local government. The installation of the negotiating table was a direct product of the collective manifestation of disagreement by resident communities. It consisted of tightly structured meetings chaired by a neutral arbiter, the *Veeduría Distrital*, in which stakeholders had the opportunity to discuss specific concerns.[10]

Some of the rules established for the process included the explicit definition of the parties involved in the negotiation: Bogotá's Planning Secretariat; the Los Andes University as the promoter of the project; representatives of the civic organizations *Multifamiliares Calle* 20; the *Asociación Mutualista La Sagrada*

Figure 6. Protests against the *Fenicia* project. (*Source*: Facebook page of 'Don't take over Las Aguas')

Familia; and the *Community of the Houses*; together with the *Veeduría Distrital* as neutral arbiter of the process. Additionally, the topics that were to be discussed were established beforehand and included a set of specific issues: the formal creation of participation instances with public entities for owners and inhabitants of the project area; guarantees that replacement units would be located in the same block as they were currently located; the possibility of freezing public service tariffs in replacement units; the allocation of project resources for social projects to mitigate the impacts on the community of the transition towards the new urban project.

A final item of the negotiation framework was the definition of conditions that needed to be met for an issue to be deemed to have been agreed. These conditions included agreement that every issue agreed on during the negotiation must have been validated by community assemblies and that only collective matters could be discussed.

After twelve work sessions that took place over a five-month period, several agreements were reached on almost every matter of discussion. These ranged from the explicit commitment of the city and the promoter to ensure community participation and a budget for the investment that was to be made in

public spaces, urban facilities and social programmes, to the definition of specific rules for partnering landowners with the project, and for the relocation of original residents. Most issues of discussion were explicitly included in the formal administrative act of adoption of the partial plan: Decree 420 of 2014 (Veeduría Distrital, 2014).

However, there were crucial issues on which the parties were unable to reach consensus: most notably, the concerns of the community regarding the forthcoming rise in the cost of public services.[11] The local government considered that this discussion could not be dealt with by the partial plan, as it went beyond the scope of the instrument and the competence of the Planning Secretariat.

Nevertheless, this issue illustrated a very important problem of urban renewal processes that frequently results in the indirect displacement of original residents, and was therefore a subject that demanded discussion by the city. In consequence, and as a direct result of the process of negotiation of the *Fenicia* project, the mayor's office passed Decree 448 of 2014, that regulated the incentives policy for the generation of urban renewal projects that promote the protection of the original owners and dwellers. This decree introduced a general set of measures intended to protect original residents in every urban renewal project in the city, including the guarantee to freeze the cost of public services for ten years for households from the original population. This illustrates how local conflict and negotiation in the *Fenicia* project impacted overall policy regarding urban renewal processes for the entire city, and that effects of this kind tend to remain in place, as they were formally included in the city's legal framework.

Third Stage: Implementation of the Agreements

Based on the grounds and definitions established in the approval of the partial plan, the university, as promoter of the project, continued the process of dialogue and informa-tion sharing with the community, as well as with city hall stakeholders, in order to initiate the implementation phase. The process of implementation during this stage refers to the definition of the administrative and legal procedures required to consolidate the plots so that the urban redevelopment could take place. According to Colombian regulations, this must be governed by the established procedure for the delimitation of Urban Action Units (UAU)[12] which is able to make 'declarations of priority development' (Pinilla, 2018). This procedure establishes a two-stage process land consolidation: first, the UAU formally adopts the specific agreements that define the contribution the land in question will make to the project – a power that can only be asserted if landowners who together possess at least 51 per cent of the planning area are in agreement. Second, once these majorities are achieved, legal measures such as eminent domain may be used to acquire the property units of reluctant owners. Additionally, the declaration of priority development means that these agreements must be finalized in less than six months.

A UAU declaration of priority development legitimizes the work carried out over the course of several years and recognizes the intention to develop a zone of the city through an integral project that will benefit not only the city as a whole but also the owners. In this sense, the objective of the declaration of priority development is: (*a*) to determine the priority development or construction of property units that will form UAUs, according to the priorities established in the partial plan; and (*b*) to recognize the collective interest in the execution of the UAU, in order to prioritize and execute the negotiation with the participation of the original property owners.

In the case of the *Fenicia* project the mediating role of the university in publicising the idea that once the majority of landowners had expressed their willingness to participate, the expropriation of the property of owners unwilling to take part in the project

Figure 7. Meetings with the owners of the UAU1 2016. (*Photos*: Universidad de los Andes, 2016)

should be seen as a way of ensuring the majority position is respected. Group and individual meetings were organized to explain how it is common in projects of this kind to find cases where people use the strategy of withholding their property indefinitely in an attempt to improve their individual bargaining positions by being the last to reach agreement.

As a result of the discussion process (figure 7), the majority of owners involved in the first UAUs (Nos. 1, 4, and 3 out of 5), who between them controlled around 90 per cent of the land, declared their intention to participate in the UAU process, and signed a special document in which they agreed to commit themselves to moving forward and contributing their property to the trust scheme created for the purpose within the next several months.

During this period of negotiation on the involvement of landowners in the land readjustment process defined by the partial plan, the rules and criteria established were crucial to coordinating dialogue and agreement between the different stakeholders. Due to the participative and negotiated approach of the approval process, the community and the promoter reached a common understanding and recognition that enabled them to advance in the final negotiation stage prior to the redevelopment phase (figure 8).

From our perspective, the relative success of this process of formalizing agreements on land management may be explained by the balanced combination of the following items:

1. A set of clear rules regarding property exchange, that were negotiated with, and appropriated by, the community;
2. A process of further discussion and formalization of the agreements with the specific groups of owners of each UAU;
3. A strict period of time (six months starting from the administrative delimitation of each UAU) for the definition of the final agreement on the partnering of landowners with the project; and

4. An inverse incentive (expropriation of unwilling owners) for owners who opt to pursue a negotiation strategy of indefinitely delaying their participation in the project;
5. A mediation role that was led by the university, by which the mechanism of expropriation was presented as a means to guarantee the effectiveness of land readjustment, once a vast majority of landowners agreed to contribute their land for the project.

Fourth Stage: The Entry of Private Developers

In the second semester of 2018, through the *Fenicia* Trust, the university invited a group of thirty-five construction companies to express their interest in joining the project as construction investors.

The purpose was to select a partner-developer which would be responsible for completing the final phase of the project's construction design, financing the construction phase of the new public space and buildings, and executing the project in accordance with the rules and conditions established in the partial plan and its UAUs, including the delivery of replacement homes and shops to partnered landowners.

The *Fenicia* project already had a particularly good reputation and the initial interest of investors was most likely related to the leading role played by the university in its formulation and approval. However, during the process of reviewing and analysing the conditions of the call, several of the interested construction companies and investors expressed doubts about the degree of certainty offered by the land management scheme. They believed that this variable generated a great risk because, at the time the call was made public, the process of formally partnering the landowners with the project was still in its early stages and there were no precedents in Bogotá of a successful experience of land readjustment for urban renewal on such a scale.

These doubts created a major dilemma for the future of the project. At that time, even

Figure 8. Informative posters about the process and the project made by the grassroots organizations. (*Photos*: Authors)

though the trust building and negotiation processes were very advanced, community leaders constantly reiterated the need for greater clarity and precision regarding the final design of the buildings and housing and business units that were to be built as part of the project, as a condition of agreeing to formally partner with the trust. For the university's part, it was clear that this definitive design process could not take place without certainty about who would eventually be chosen as the project's investor-constructor.

This situation exposed an apparent paradox that complicated the completion of the project: in order to achieve the required land pooling, it seemed necessary to provide definitive architectural designs that would encourage the owners to negotiate and contribute, however potential construction investors – including those working on the final design of the buildings – wanted the pooling of the land completed before they would commit.

Faced with this dilemma, the university chose to start negotiations with potential partner-developers by presenting the design of the land management scheme in detail, in order to persuade them by explaining the benefits of the inclusive model. For some investors, the novelty of the scheme[13] and the risks associated with this innovative manner of land management dissuaded them from continuing in the process. For others, although the project, its location and spirit remained attractive, the uncertainty associated with the schedule and the lack of a definitive guarantee that they would be able to acquire the consolidated land, prevented them from presenting their final proposals.

Once again, the coordination and mediation role played by the university was key. Without the persuasive and detailed explanation of the model, the provision of information on the near decade-long trust building process, and of the collaborative model of policymaking and cooperation between stakeholders that characterized the project, it would not have been possible to achieve

the formal presentation of proposals. Once the proposals had been reviewed and evaluated, and a final phase of negotiation completed, through the Trust, the university decided to select one of the consortiums made up of three large Colombian construction companies.

Conclusions

The *Fenicia* project is a prime example of how conflict can generate changes in the spatial transformation of built environments, the governance structures of urban renewal projects, and the procedures and practices followed by the different stakeholders which come together in processes of urban renewal, including public institutions and private agents. This case study shows that when the parties involved have the will to do so, and there are sufficient scenarios for engaging in conflict, the outputs can contribute to improvements to the process in terms of its transparency, legitimacy and feasibility.

Here it is important to underscore two features of the *Fenicia* case, namely the social and political context in which it unfolded, and the nature of the stakeholders who took part in the project. Regarding the context, the implementation of the partial plan occurred during a crisis of urban renewal in Bogotá's downtown area, including stagnation of administrative procedures for the approval of plans, general discontent of resident communities concerning such projects, and citizens' widespread lack of trust in public institutions and their role in this kind of project.

Regarding the parties involved in the design and execution of the plan, it is important to note that the project is unlike conventional models of neoliberal urbanization as the promoter of the plan – Los Andes University – distanced itself from a market-driven urban reconstruction process, given its nature as an institution of higher education rather than as a 'conventional' private developer. This circumstance allowed the university to

actively promote a transition from a rational to a collaborative model of planning. It is equally important to emphasize that the public officials in charge of the approval of the plan also privileged and promoted a community-based approach over the standard legal procedures that were common in the Planning Secretariat.

However, the strengthening of grassroots organizations and the overall involvement and activism of the resident community that emerged at the beginning of the second stage of the *Fenicia* project made a crucial contribution to improving the negotiation process and therefore the project itself. The collective evidence of contrasting interests represented a shift in the governance structure of the plan in terms of achieving a balance in the bargaining capital of the negotiating parties in favour of otherwise unrepresented interests, such as resident communities. Such change is a peculiarity of this plan, which contrasts with the classic understanding that land readjustment schemes are achievable only where a certain degree of collective organization already exists (Karki, 2004), since in this case the strengthening of social bonds and of grassroots organizations occurred as a result of the implementation of the proposed land readjustment. This apparent paradox can be explained by examining the *Fenicia* project as a consensus-building process rather than a mere urban renewal operation: in particular Innes and Booher (1999) point out that in such processes 'Outcomes also include intangibles, which can be more important than the tangible products. These can be thought of as social, intellectual, and political capital'. Furthermore, the authors explain that 'In every process we observed, participants contended that they established new or stronger personal and professional relationships and built up trust' (Innes and Booher, 1999, pp. 414–415). Such intangible effects can also be seen in the *Fenicia* project.

It is particularly interesting that the results of the conflict management process in this case not only affected the specific project, via the formal incorporation of measures for the protection of inhabitants, but also affected the general policy of urban renewal in the city. Further, there is evidence of the positive impact of recognizing community-based organizations in legally binding documents, as well as in the formal adoption of the plan. Such a positive impact is related to the legitimacy and widespread recognition of the legal instrument as a guideline for the implementation of the plan, thus imbuing the process with long-term stability and transparency. However, it is important to note that the output of the negotiation was achieved mainly through means intended to promote the participation of landowners. This implies that it is more difficult to include and account for housing and retail lessees, informal vendors and occupants of public spaces. This situation tends to be a weakness of all land readjustment schemes, even those that are more inclusive and participative than *Fenicia* (Hong and Tierney, 2018).

It should be noted that the underlying tensions and conflict that characterized this project show the importance of having stakeholders who are engaged with a mediation role. The role played by organizations (in this case the Los Andes University and the *Veeduria Distrital*), that are willing to facilitate the interaction of diverse interests and stakeholders (both private and public) and contribute to finding forms of balancing different expectations, is crucial to overcoming conflict and finding ways of understanding and recognition among, sometimes even antagonist, stakeholders. Traditionally, it is either government or private developers which promote urban redevelopment projects. In the case of the *Fenicia* project, there was suspicion among the community about the motives of these actors. For this reason, organizations such as universities, which may be more engaged in mediation roles, are more suitable when it comes to engendering greater openness and reciprocity between stakeholders.

We would also stress that, even though the *Fenicia* project remains an ongoing consensus-building process, its analysis also contributes to the identification of the projected results of such processes overall. This case study showcases many of the outcomes that are deemed desirable and that might be classified as first, second and third order effects by authors such as Innes and Booher (1999).

Moreover, the inclusion of consensus-building and the positive outcomes are closely related to the different ways in which conflict took place at every stage of the project: unresolved conflict in the *Manzana* 5 project led to widespread unrest and mistrust by local communities, which in turn resulted in a shift in the university's approach to the *Fenicia* project. This led to a failed attempt to characterize local communities using standard methods such as a generalized census, which then prompted qualitative methods, such as ethnographic studies, to be used to characterize local dynamics. Next, participative urban design workshops allowed underlying tensions among residents to emerge, which in turn established the need for local communities to organize into more formal representative governance bodies. Once the community was politically organized and active, public institutions and the university were forced to promote the installation of a formal negotiation table with the participation of neutral arbiters. This process resulted in the enactment of a city-wide policy for the protection of original residents in every urban renewal project subsequently developed in Bogotá. Finally, given that the design of the project was carried out in a participative manner, there was general consensus that it was legitimate to expropriate unwilling landowners in order to protect the collective agreements that were achieved, thus making it possible to assemble the land through a process of land readjustment.

As for the first order effects, we have already highlighted several positive effects that occurred as a result of consensus building: for example, improvements in levels of trust and in relationships between residents, and the ability to achieve high-quality agreements. In the case of second order effects, it can be seen that coordination and collective action are clear characteristics of the *Fenicia* project, as is the fact that joint learning has extended into the community. Finally, the third order effects that can be identified include a widespread recognition by different stakeholders of the existence of a collaborative and coevolutive environment in which the different parties share a common interest and are reliant on each other for its execution. This project illustrates the potential of a consensus-building approach in the implementation of urban redevelopment projects. As such, it highlights the need to recognize both that conflict is immanent in these types of projects as well as the complexity of the coordination and collective action of diverse stakeholders, and its impacts on the effective implementation of collaborative governance and planning scenarios.

Finally, a particularly important effect that can be identified in the *Fenicia* project is that, by using conflict management techniques, it was possible to achieve a suitable implementation of land readjustment, which included the active participation and convergence of resident communities, public institutions and real estate developers, that in turn allowed for more inclusive urban renewal processes.

NOTES

1. The American Planning Association granted the 2020 International Planning Excellence Award in the category of Community and Regional Planning to the *Fenicia* project.

2. Some of the interviews in this research paper were conducted as part of a joint research between JFP & Asociados-Derecho Urbano, the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) and the Interamerican Bank of Development (IDB) into governance in urban renewal and regeneration policies and practices in Colombia and South Korea.

3. It is important to underline that one of us (Juan Felipe Pinilla) has been part of the promoter team of the plan as a land management and urban law advisor since 2010.

4. As Aprile-Ginset (1991) describes, a handful of private companies benefited greatly from state-driven urban renewal in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Niño and Reina (2010) point out that the expansion of an arterial road (10th Avenue), seen as a real estate operation, was designed to benefit 'Bogotá's elite' economically.

5. Based on the theory that visible signs of crime and antisocial behaviour in an urban environment encourage further crime and disorder.

6. El Cartucho neighbourhood was an area of Bogotá's downtown that was commonly related to drug dealing and homelessness.

7. Here it is important to note that these are two neighbouring projects, only divided by a tiny local road (*Calle 20*).

8. The *Junta de Acción Comunal* is a formally instituted civic, social and community organization of social management that is voluntarily integrated by the residents of a neighbourhood.

9. The Silence Rally of 1947 was a paradigmatic civic demonstration led by Jorge Eliecer Gaitan to protest against state driven violence against liberal partisans. This demonstration was so characterized because it took place at night and assistants silently marched holding light torches.

10. The *Veeduría Distrital* is an agency of the city government whose main mission is to promote transparency and prevent corruption in public management of the district. One of its objectives is to encourage citizens to exert control over the activities, programmes and projects carried out by different city government agencies. For more information consult: www.veeduriadistrital.gov.co.

11. In Colombia, public services are subject to a crossed subsidy for which households are assigned a specific 'strata' (1 being the households with the lowest income and thus receiving a higher subsidy and 6 being the households with the highest income, paying the highest tariffs for public services in order to subsidize other households). However, this system of stratification of households also has a very distinct connotation of class violence and overall marginalization of the population according to their strata.

12. Urban Action Units are defined as the area that is composed by one or many land plots, which are to be developed or built as one planning unit, in order to promote a rational use of the land, guarantee the compliance with urban regulations, and facilitate the provision of urban infrastructure at expense of the owners through the equitable distribution of burden and benefit.

13. Even though Colombia has had specific regulation on land readjustment ever since 1989, its application is not a general practice for land assembly. Even though there are some cases where this mode of land management has been employed in the development of areas of city extension, there is no previous record of a land readjustment for an urban renewal project on the scale of that in the *Fenicia* project. In general terms, developers usually do not go for this kind of more transparent and inclusive means for land management, opting for the direct acquisition of land by market means or expect the state to expropriate the necessary land for the project.

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